Faithfully Taking Pascal’s Wager

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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between Pascal’s wager, faith, and hope. First, I argue that many who take Pascal’s wager have genuine faith that God exists. The person of faith and the wagerer have several things in common, including a commitment to God and positive cognitive and conative attitudes toward God’s existence. I also argue that if one's credences in theism are too low to have faith, the wagerer can still hope that God exists, another commitment-justifying theological virtue. I consider two upshots of my argument, including how my picture provides responses to common objections to Pascal’s wager.

Keywords: Faith, Hope, Pascal’s Wager, Commitment

1. Introduction

Should you believe in God? Proponents of Pascal’s wager argue yes, but for a different reason than the traditional theistic arguments provide. Proponents of the wager argue that you should believe in God because, by believing, you have much to gain and little to lose (see Table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>God exists (Pr = n)</th>
<th>God doesn’t exist (Pr = 1-n)</th>
<th>EV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believe in God</td>
<td>ω</td>
<td>f1</td>
<td>ω</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t believe in God</td>
<td>-ω</td>
<td>f2</td>
<td>-ω</td>
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Table 1: Pascal’s Wager

If God exists, the value of believing in God is infinitely positive (given the possibility of going to heaven and having a relationship with and union with God), and the value of not believing is infinitely negative (given the possibility of going to hell and being separated from God). If God does not exist, the gains and losses associated with either course of action (f1 and f2) are both finite, and thus negligible in the face of infinite gains/losses. Thus, as long as one thinks that n, the probability that God exists, is non-zero (and non-infinitesimal), one practically ought to believe in God.

The wager has been criticized on a variety of fronts, but I will set aside many classic objections for the purposes of this paper.1 Here, I’m concerned with a worry that has to do with the motives associated with taking the wager. Some claim that those that take Pascal’s wager are simply motivated by a fear of hell or a selfish desire to get the rewards of heaven. But these sorts of motives don’t seem to underlie a genuine theistic commitment. Furthermore, God wouldn’t be pleased with someone who takes Pascal’s wager, because it’s associated with these bad motives. Then, it’s not even clear that believing in God for Pascalian reasons would realize the positive outcome reflected in Table 1.2

To respond to this sort of objection, my goal in this paper is to show how taking Pascal’s wager need not reflect poor or selfish motives. What’s more, I argue that there’s a way of taking Pascal’s

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1 A co-author and I respond to many other objections to Pascal’s wager, such as the many gods objection, mixed strategies objection, and Pascal’s mugging, in Jackson and Rogers (2019).
wager that demonstrates genuine faith. Second, I’ll argue that even if the wagerer’s confidence in theism is too low to demonstrate faith, taking the wager can demonstrate hope. I’ll show how, on both pictures, taking the wager expresses virtuous motives, and that both faith and hope can underlie a genuine and rational theistic commitment.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I’ll clarify what exactly counts as taking Pascal’s wager. Then, I’ll show how the wagerer has quite a bit in common with recent (plausible) accounts of religious faith, and argue that if one takes Pascal’s wager, one has faith that God exists. I then consider a few upshots of my argument. In Section 3, I’ll address hope, and how, if the wagerer doesn’t meet the requirements for having faith, she may nonetheless have hope. In Section 4, I conclude.

2. Faithfully Taking Pascal’s Wager

2.1 Taking Pascal’s Wager

My goal in this paper isn’t to argue that it is impossible to take Pascal’s wager with poor motives. Of course this is possible. My goal is to carve out a way that one could take the wager virtuously, in a way that demonstrates genuine faith or genuine hope. Further, I’ll show how Pascalian reasoning can underlie and rationalize a genuine theistic commitment.

What do I mean by “taking the wager”? Roughly, I mean something like the following:

**Taking Pascal’s Wager**: making a commitment to God, largely motivated by non-epistemic reasons.

A few clarifications about this. First, “making a commitment to God” should be read broadly. It includes as least two ways of wagering—the doxastic wager, i.e. a belief-oriented wager that involves choosing to believe that God exists or taking steps to induce belief in God. The second is the acceptance wager, i.e. an action-oriented wager that involves accepting, or acting as if, God exists, and going to church, praying, reading Scripture, immersing oneself in a religious community, etc. Some have worried that the doxastic wager is problematic for various reasons—a common worry is that we don’t have the right kind of control over our beliefs. While I’m not convinced this objection is ultimately devastating for the doxastic wager, we need not take a stand on this here. So we can understand the wager in terms of belief or action.

Second, “non-epistemic” reasons include both practical and moral reasons. On the traditional version of the wager, the wagerer’s primary concerns are practical. However, Rota (2016) has recently argued that one might also wager for moral reasons, whether that be the well-being of those close to you, or even considerations about what God would desire or require, if God existed. Thus, the positive consequences associated with wagering can be either practical or moral. I say that the wagerer will be largely motivated by non-epistemic reasons because, a recent lesson from the literature on Pascal’s wager is that we must acknowledge that probability matters, even in the infinite case. This is for at least two reasons, One, the probability of God’s existence must be non-zero (and non-infinitesimal) to even get the wager off the ground. Two, the most plausible

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3 Rota (2016) defends the acceptance wager.
5 See Jackson (2021-b) for an exception to this—a version of the wager that appeals to epistemic consequentialism, so the expected epistemic value of wagering gives one an epistemic reason to believe in God.
response to the many gods and mixed strategies objections to Pascal’s wager acknowledges that the probabilities of various religions matter—in deciding both whether to wager on God and what religion to wager on. So epistemic reasons have a role to play—even if not a starring role.

Third, on the version of the wager I’m concerned with, the wagerer is motivated primarily by the goodness of the outcome of God’s existence, given they commit to God—the shaded box in Table 2.

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<td>-ω</td>
<td>f₂</td>
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Table 2: Why Take Pascal’s Wager

The wagerer reasons that if God exists and they commit to God, that would be a very good thing. They realize that, if God existed—a powerful, good being who created the universe—God is someone they should want to pursue and make a commitment to. Thus, even the possibility God exists provides a strong reason to pursue a relationship with God, because knowing such a being would be so incredibly valuable. Whether this goodness is pragmatic, moral, or both, they maintain that committing to God if God exists would lead to a positive outcome, and this is the primary reason they wager. Once they commit, then they maintain that God’s existence would be a good thing. After all, they’ve bet their life on it.

2.2 The Nature of Faith

Now, we turn to a second question, that may at first seem unrelated to Pascal’s wager: what is faith? More specifically, we’ll focus on the question: what is to have faith that a proposition is true?

To answer this question, consider the difference between two kinds of mental states. Cognitive mental states have a mind-to-world direction of fit. They represent the world. They are normally truth-tracking, responsive to evidence, and evaluable from primarily an epistemic point of view. Examples of cognitive mental states include beliefs, credences, and probability-beliefs.

Conative mental states, by contrast, have a world-to-mind direction of fit. They reflect what an agent takes to be desirable or valuable, and are inherently motivating. They needn’t involve evidence or epistemic justification for their contents. (I can desire that p, even knowing p is false—e.g. I desire a catastrophe never occurred, but I know it did. Of course, for the belief "p is good" to be justified, one needs evidence that p is good or desirable—but one doesn’t need evidence that p is true.) Examples of conative mental states include desires, pro-attitudes, and beliefs about the good.

With this distinction in mind, here’s a first pass at a definition of having faith that p (Howard-Snyder 2013; Buchak 2012):

S has faith that p iff:

(i*') S has a positive conative attitude toward p (e.g. thinking p would be a good thing, desiring p)  
(ii*') S has a positive cognitive attitude toward p (e.g. thinking p is likely, having a high credence in p, believing p), and

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7 See Benton (2018) for an argument that one could know God interpersonally without knowing that God exists.
8 Relevant here is the axiology of theism literature, see Kraay (2018, forthcoming) and Lougheed (2020).
(iii*) $S$ is resilient to new counterevidence against $p$.\(^9\)

Something similar to this definition is quite popular in the faith literature, and for good reason. It explains many cases of faith. Let’s suppose I have faith that you will win your upcoming basketball game. In this case, I want you to win—it doesn’t make sense to say I have faith you’ll win if I want you to lose. Further, I take it to be sufficiently likely that you will win—if I take it to be, say, impossible you’ll win, then I probably can’t (and definitely shouldn’t) have faith you’ll win. And finally, I will, to some extent, continue to have faith even in light of counterevidence—for example, if one of your starting players gets injured, I will continue to have faith that you’ll win. (This doesn’t mean I’ll have faith in light of any amount of counterevidence, especially if my faith is rational.)

One might wonder about condition (ii*), especially in light of a recent debate in the faith literature: whether faith that $p$ entails belief that $p$. The definition above lends itself to the idea that one can have faith that $p$ without believing that $p$, since it’s natural to think that cognitive states besides belief can play the role of (ii*).\(^10\) This includes (but is not limited to): a high credence/high confidence in $p$, believing $p$ is likely, thinking $p$ is well-supported by evidence, thinking $p$ is most likely of the alternatives, and thinking $p$ is more likely than not.\(^11\) This raises several questions, including the question of how weak these cognitive attitudes can be (e.g. can a 0.4 credence play the relevant role?). We’ll return to this question later.\(^12\) I’ll also discuss versions of my view that fit with the idea that faith entails belief, so we can remain ecumenical on the relationship between belief and faith.

A potential defect of the above definition is that it doesn’t capture the idea that faith seems to be deeply intertwined with, and underlie, many of our important life commitments. Faith is central to, e.g., upholding a new year’s resolution, the commitment that fans have to their sports teams, religious commitment, surviving a serious illness, marriage, or finishing graduate school (see Jackson forthcoming). I take a commitment to be action-oriented: roughly, a resolution to act in certain ways over a period of time.

Now, a long-term commitment might not be associated with all cases of faith that $p$. I might have faith that a chair will hold me, but seemingly do not commit to that chair. Although, if the notion of commitment is very thin, perhaps I do have some kind of commitment to the chair. Further, if faith always involves commitment this seems to nicely explain why condition (iii*) holds, and faith is resilient to counterevidence. Either way, I won’t take a stand on the exact general relationship between faith and commitment. I’m interested in a particular case of faith: faith that God exists. And it’s much clearer that faith that God exists involves some kind of commitment to God, even if faith in general doesn’t. (Note that one could be a theist without having faith that God exists or a commitment to God. The claim isn’t that merely believing that God exists involves a religious commitment. Rather, the claim is that those who have faith that God exists commit to God.)

Summing up what we’ve discussed so far, $S$ has faith that God exists if:

(i) $S$ has a positive conative attitude toward God’s existence (e.g. thinking God’s existence would be a good thing, desiring God’s existence)

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\(^9\) Howard-Snyder (2013) adds a fourth condition: you need some kind of positive affective evaluation of $p$ (e.g. positively valenced emotions toward $p$). These emotions may be commonly associated with faith, but in my view, they are either subsumed under condition (i*) or not strictly required (consider the Christian who “isn’t feeling it” but decides to, e.g. go to church, tithe, etc., anyway. Doing so seem to demonstrate faith, even if they lack the relevant emotions).


\(^12\) For more on how weak the cognitive component of faith can be, see Jackson (2019).
(ii) S has a positive cognitive attitude toward God’s existence (e.g. thinking God’s existence is likely, having a high credence in God’s existence, believing that God exists),
(iii) S is resilient to new counterevidence against God’s existence, and
(iv) S commits to God.

For my argument, I only need that (i)–(iv) are jointly sufficient for having theistic faith; I don’t need that they are necessary (and while they are widely regarded to be necessary, some have challenged this orthodoxy; see Malcolm and Scott 2021). This is because I will now argue that those who take Pascal’s wager have faith that God exists in virtue of satisfying these four conditions. In other words: at least a subset of the conditions that are sufficient for taking Pascal’s wager are sufficient for having faith that God exists. But this leaves open whether there are other ways to have faith that God exists (and of course, other ways to have faith in other propositions, or faith in general). And this is plausible, because not all with theistic faith are wagerers.

2.3 The Faith of the Wagerer

To sum up: we’ve seen first that those who take Pascal’s wager commit to God, largely for non-epistemic reasons, and they are motivated by the goodness of the outcome on which they commit to God and God exists. We’ve then seen that faith that God exists is a mental state with four components: cognitive, conative, resilience, and commitment.

Those with faith that God exists and those who take Pascal’s wager, then, have much in common:
(i) They have a positive conative attitude toward God’s existence.
(ii) They have a positive cognitive attitude toward God’s existence.
(iii) They are resilient to counterevidence to p (where this can be either a mental thing or an action-oriented thing).
(iv) They make a commitment (i.e. to God, to live a particular kind of life).

We’ve discussed how these characterize faith. But do these characterize taking Pascal’s wager? Yes. The wagerer has a positive conative attitude toward God’s existence—they are motivated by the goodness of their committing to God, given God exists, and once they commit to God, they desire God to exist. They also have a positive cognitive attitude toward God’s existence—recall that you shouldn’t take the wager if your credence in theism is 0 (or infinitesimally small). The wagerer is plausibly also resilient to counterevidence to God’s existence, in part because their commitment is based on non-epistemic reasons. Since non-epistemic reasons keep them going, they can maintain their commitment to God even in light of counterevidence. And both the person of faith and the wagerer commit to God—whether this involves a doxastic wager (a commitment to believe in God) or an acceptance wager (a commitment to live as if God exists).

Thus, if S takes Pascal’s wager (in the way described in sec. 2.1), S has faith that God exists.

Two things to note about this claim. First, this claim is neutral on whether faith entails belief. If faith entails belief, my argument is simply limited to the doxastic wager.13 In other words, if one believes in God because of Pascal’s wager (either directly or via taking steps to induce belief), then one demonstrates genuine faith. While this raises the question of whether believing in God for this reason could be epistemic rationally—because if not, it would appear that whatever faith is demonstrated is importantly defective—I’ve argued that taking the doxastic wager can be epistemically (not merely practically) rational (see Jackson 2021-a).

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13 Mugg (2016) and Malcolm and Scott (2016) argue that faith entails belief.
Second, as mentioned above, I'm not claiming having faith is sufficient for taking Pascal's wager. One may make a commitment to God primarily based on epistemic reasons, and thus not take Pascal's wager but nonetheless have faith—if they have the right cognitive and conative attitudes, their commitment is resilient in light of counterevidence, etc. Again, I’m arguing that at least a subset of the conditions that are sufficient for taking Pascal's wager is sufficient for having faith, not that all who have theistic faith wager on God.14

This brings me to two upshots of my argument. First, it is possible to take the wager with virtuous and honorable motives. The wagerer is motivated by the goodness of knowing God, if God exists, and, by wagering, demonstrates faith that God exists. Faith is a theological virtue and a central, if not the central, mark of a devoted religious life. Thus, I hope to have carved out a way of taking the wager that demonstrates virtuous motivates that would please God.

Second, another objection that has been raised to Pascal's wager is the impossibility objection—taking the wager is impossible because (e.g.) one cannot force oneself to believe in God.15 However, we’ve seen that taking Pascal’s wager demonstrates faith. And if faith, rather than belief, is what God requires, then those who wager won’t have to force themselves to believe.16 Rather, the commitment that results from taking Pascal’s wager will be sufficient, as it constitutes having faith. Of course, if one thinks the only legitimate way of wagering is the doxastic wager, or thinks that faith entails belief, then they made need an additional story about why we have more control over our beliefs than many philosophers think. Luckily, I’ve given an extensive argument for this elsewhere (Jackson 2021-a).

3. Hopefully Taking Pascal’s Wager

In this section, I explain how hope answers an outstanding objection to the above proposal. One might raise the following worry: even if faith doesn’t entail belief, it doesn’t seem like faith that God exists is consistent with any non-zero (non-infinitesimal) credence that God exists. For example, if someone has a 0.01 credence that God exists, it seems like having faith that God exists is impossible, or at the very least irrational. In this case, one might rationally take Pascal’s wager (even if the probability God exists is small, there’s nonetheless a lot to gain by wagering and little to lose by not wagering), but not count as having faith.

Before turning to hope, note that faith may be consistent with quite low credences. This is most difficult to maintain if faith entails belief, but recently some have argued that rational belief is consistent with credences below 0.5.17 Further, if faith doesn’t entail belief, faith could be consistent with even lower credences than belief, as I argue in Jackson (2019). For example, it may be that you should only give up your faith in the face of certain types of evidence, but some kinds of evidence (like statistical evidence) can chip away at your credence but not require you to give up a belief.

14 If faith that God exists is inconsistent with credence 1 that God exists, then all those who have faith may be in some position of uncertainty, and in some sense thus wager on God. But I won’t take a stand on this here.
16 For evidence that faith, rather than belief, is what God requires for salvation, see Poojman (1986), Spera (2007), McKaughan (2017) and Howard-Snyder (2017).
Whether faith entails belief or not, the most popular and plausible response to the many-gods objection to Pascal’s wager says that, all else equal, you should pick the religion that is the most likely of the live options. In many cases, this might fulfill the relevant cognitive component of faith—as mentioned earlier, taking a possibility to be the most likely of the live options is a potential cognitive component of faith. Further, Hawthorne et al (2016) argue that rational belief is consistent with low credences in some cases when you believe the most likely of the live options (even if it is nonetheless somewhat unlikely in absolute terms). Of course, this doesn’t entail that one always ought to believe the most likely live possibility, but interestingly, this could be a case where faith and/or belief are consistent with credences below 0.5.

My second response is that even if one’s credences are too low to count as having faith, the wagerer may nonetheless hope that God exists. Hope is similar to, but importantly distinct from, faith. On the standard view,

S hopes that p iff  
(i) S has a positive conative attitude toward p, and  
(ii) S has a weak positive cognitive attitude toward p (e.g. a non-zero credence in p, a belief that p is possible).  

Like faith, hope has a positive conative component. Hoping for p requires a desire for p to be true, a pro-attitude toward p, or a belief that p is very good. As Born (2018: 107) notes, ‘Hope is essentially a desire, a pro-attitude…’ Almost everyone in the hope literature maintains that a positive conative component is necessary for hope. However, the cognitive component of hope is much weaker than faith’s. In the case of faith, if one has a very low credence in p, one shouldn’t—and most wouldn’t—continue to have faith. But hope is uncontroversially consistent with very low credences—as long as they are non-zero. I’m using the phrase “weak positive cognitive attitude toward p” as a technical term, to pick out states that leave the possibility of p open, such as a non-zero credence in p and a belief that p is possible.

Consider some examples. If there’s a 95% chance of rain tomorrow but I have a picnic planned, I can hope it won’t rain tomorrow, since I want that to be true and take it to be possible. A loss of evidence may also cause one to move from faith to hope. Recall above the case where I had faith your basketball team will win an upcoming game. Suppose I get quite a bit of evidence you won’t win—maybe all of your starting five players get injured and cannot play. The probability you’ll win, then, is quite low. However, I can nonetheless hope that you will win—though it’s unlikely, my credence you’ll win isn’t zero, and I have a strong desire for you to win.

Due to two puzzles about hope—one that involves distinguishing hope from despair, and another that involves explaining hope’s motivating power in difficult circumstances—some have argued that (i) and (ii), while necessary for hope, are not sufficient for hope. For example, Meirav (2009) argues that hope involves “an external factor”—an attitude towards some factor (e.g., nature, fate, God) on which the realization of the hoped-for end causally depends. Calhoun (2018) argues that hope provides the hopeful a “phenomenological idea of the future.” On Martin (2013)’s “incorporation” account of hope, the hopeful’s cognitive attitudes provide a “justificatory rationale” for related emotions and actions. Finally, Chignell (2021)’s “focus theory” of hope entails that hoping involves special attention to the hoped-for outcome.

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18 Downie (1963: 248); Day (1969: 89); see Milona (2019) for a recent defense of the standard view. For an overview of the nature and rationality of hope, see Rioux (forthcoming-a).

19 Note that hope is consistent with high credences, but (arguably) not maximally high—it seems odd to hope that p if you are certain that p. Then, as Martin (2013: 69) notes, hope that p is consistent with any credence in p between, but excluding, 1 and 0.
I maintain that Pascal’s wager is sufficient for hope. Fortunately, when one commits to God based on Pascal’s wager, motivated by the goodness of the outcome of God’s existence, they plausibly satisfy these extra conditions that, in conjunction with (i) and (ii), are sufficient for hope. The wagerer is committed to God as the external factor on which their hope depends. In virtue of their commitment to God, they exemplify Calhoun’s “phenomenological idea of the future”, and the relevant actions and emotions of Martin’s account are justified for them. Finally, as described in 2.1, the wagerer also plausibly pays special attention to the hoped-for outcome (namely, that God exists), as Chignell’s theory describes.

This brings me to my ultimate and final thesis: if one takes Pascal’s wager, then one either has faith that God exists or hopes that God exists. This is significant both in and of itself, but also because faith and hope are theological virtues. I aim to have dispelled the idea that taking Pascal’s wager is inherently selfish or demonstrates poor motives. On the contrary: on a natural way of taking the wager, the wagerer exemplifies theological virtues. Taking the wager is thus not only virtuous, but also plausibly something that would be pleasing to God.

Before I conclude, I’ll consider one final worry. If one’s taking the wager merely demonstrates hope that God exists, does this answer the impossibility objection discussed above? In other words, does merely hoping that God exists lead to the good outcome of the shaded box in Table 2? To be maximally charitable to the objector, I’ll assume that we are dealing with a hopeful person who takes the acceptance wager, rather than the doxastic wager. In response, first, note that going from completely uncommitted to committed to God and hoping that God exists at least raises the probability that one is saved and will receive the goods of heaven. It’s difficult to be certain of the exact requirements for salvation (a subject of theological debate—e.g. universalists maintain that all will be saved, and even non-universalists disagree about the precise soteriological requirements. Belief that God exists is almost definitely not strictly necessary; e.g. young children who die before they have the capacity to believe in God are likely saved, even without belief). All we may be able to do is raise the probability of getting the good outcome of the shaded box. Second, salvation may not be the only good the wagerer is concerned with; the wagerer may also be interested in, e.g. the benefits of pursuing God during their earthly life. Or one might wager for moral reasons, concerning God and others, as discussed above. Finally, the hopeful wagerer might, as they continue in their commitment to God, eventually come to have faith and/or belief that God exists. So the hopeful wagerer puts themselves on a path to satisfy even the most stringent requirements for salvation.

4. Conclusion

I’ve argued that if one takes Pascal’s wager, then one either has faith that God exists or hopes that God exists. First, I’ve clarified what exactly counts as “taking Pascal’s wager.” Then, I’ve shown why it is plausible that if one takes Pascal’s wager, motivated by the goodness of the possibility that God exists, one has faith that God exists. I’ve shown why this is significant: it shows that it is possible to take the wager with virtuous motives, and offers a response to the impossibility objection to Pascal’s wager. Then, I’ve addressed hope, and argued that even if the wagerer doesn’t meet the requirements for having faith, she may nonetheless have hope. I’ve shown why hope is theologically (and even potentially soteriologically) significant.

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20 See Jackson (forthcoming) and Rioux (forthcoming-b) for more on how hope justifies action and commitment.
References:


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